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The New Global Governors: Globalization, Civil Society,  




One of the important drivers of change within contemporary global  
civil society is the growing power and influence of private  
philanthropic foundations (PPFs). In the analysis below, I consider the  
cases of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and the Open  
Society Foundations (OSF), the largest and fourth largest PPFs in the  
world today by wealth or assets, and, especially, their founders.  
I consider their influence within global civil society, within the   
context of international development, and the consequences of  
their activities for a range of international actors. I do so in the context  
of debate within the literature on the activities of PPFs and I side with  
advocates of critical scrutiny. In developing my argument, I draw on a  
range of sources including the financial statements and audited accounts 
 of PPFs, of other non-governmental organizations and of selected inter- 
governmental organizations. I argue that the BMGF and OSF are engines  
of neoliberalism and potent symbols of a second distinct ‘gilded age’ and  
that their influence must be restrained through anti-trust measures  




The state-building process in sovereign nation-states becomes more challenging 
when market and civil society power predates or pre-exists consolidated state power. 
Where state institutions, seeking to incrementally expand their reach and authority, must 
contend with powerful and entrenched market and civil society actors, a range of 
possibilities exist. The regime-type, for instance, may be liberal-democratic where the state 
succeeds in over-coming market and civil society power, and imposes a consensual power-
sharing arrangement (see, for instance, Moore 1966). But equally, the process can be 
flawed, leading to weak states, where market or civil society actors cannot be compelled to 
enter into a strategic compromise induced by incentives or compulsion (see, for instance, 
Migdal 2001). The possibility of weak states emerging from a stymied process of state-
building varies with the extent of market and civil society power – the greater this power, 
the less likely a strategic compromise which leads to the emergence of a centralised and 
legitimate political authority.   
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 Viewed through the lens of ‘global governance’, the existence of both a global 
market economy and a global civil society, in the absence of a global state or of sufficiently 
authoritative global political institutions, allows both market and civil society organizations 
(CSOs) to operate transnationally with weak restraints on their activities. Where market and 
civil society actors combine in the absence of effective regulatory oversight, they can gain a 
privileged foothold in transnational society, weakening the prospects for authoritative and 
legitimate global political institutions to emerge in the future or undermining those that 
already exist.  
I explore one dimension of this problem here, arguing that contemporary global 
governance is partly underpinned by a new group of ‘global governors’ rooted in both the 
global market-economy and in global civil society, who complement the traditional role of 
politicians, diplomats and international civil servants. These men (almost exclusively) 
convert significant personal wealth and organizational acumen into transnational socio-
political power through the careful nurturing of transnational foundations and allied 
networks. These private philanthropic foundations (PPFs), in turn, increasingly influence 
both the structure of international society and the nature of global governance.  
In developing this argument, I explore the work of two private philanthropic 
foundations: the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and the Open Society 
Foundations (OSF). BMGF is the largest PPF in the world (by assets and expenditure),1 while 
OSF has the largest global foot-print (Callahan 2017). In turn, I explore the work of two 
‘global governors’, BMGF co-founder William Henry Gates III (hereafter, Bill Gates) and OSF 
founder, George Soros. In 2015, Bill Gates was the world’s most generous philanthropist, 
followed by his friend and BMGF associate Warren Buffet, with George Soros the third most 
generous (Martin & Loudenback 2015). The article explores differences between these 
organizations and their founders but at heart it considers them collectively as engines of 
neoliberalism and, in historical terms, as potent symbols of a second, distinct ‘gilded age’.  
The analysis here is framed by debate within the literature. On one side, Bishop & 
Green (2008) view PPFs positively, as engines of ‘philanthrocapitalism’, enhancing public 
policy by alleviating pressure on cash-strapped governments, by applying successful models 
from the private sector and by forcing through necessary reforms to fossilised public 
                                                          
1 See further below. 
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services. On the other side, Callahan (2018) explores the growing influence of PPFs and the 
opaque ways in which PPFs set agendas and shape ideas, phenomena which, he argues, 
remain inadequately understood. Focusing on the United States case, he argues that 
While civil society was a junior partner in the twentieth century relative to 
government and business, this is changing. Philanthropy is becoming a much 
stronger power centre and, in some areas, is set to surpass government in its ability 
to shape society’s agenda (Callahan 2018: 7).   
 
I draw on insights from Callahan (2018) in the conceptual framework and analysis below. 
 
2. Background and Conceptual Framework 
To develop the argument here, I draw on a conceptual framework which unites three 
main concepts to produce two research questions. The first concept, the private 
philanthropic foundation (PPF), is an organization with a variable legal status, funded by one 
or more endowments, which does not raise funding from the public, which exists formally to 
achieve charitable aims, and which avails of distinct tax benefits. This definition covers five 
organizational types, based on US-based PPFs (the most prominent in global terms) but 
relevant in a wider context: 
• Eponymous Private Foundations (EPFs): Private philanthropic foundations named after 
one or more wealthy individuals or a family (for instance, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation); 
• Non-Eponymous Private Foundations (NEPFs): PPFs associated with a prominent 
individual or family but not named after them (for instance, the Open Society 
Foundations); 
• Charitable Trusts (CTs): PPFs with a distinct institutional character, often developed over 
time, and which have distanced themselves from the founding individual, family or 
company (eg. the Wellcome Trust);  
• Limited Liability Companies (LLCs): PPFs which support non-profit and for-profit activity 
and which have a distinct legal status allowing for both (eg. the Chan Zuckerburg 
Initiative, established by Facebook founder, Mark Zuckerberg and his wife, Priscilla Chan, 
in December 2015); 
• Donor-Advised Funds (DAFs): Philanthropic funds maintained by wealth managers and 
investment houses which allow wealthy philanthropists to support charitable activity 
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(and avail of related tax benefits) without establishing their own foundation, thus 
shielding them from public scrutiny (eg. Schwab Charitable). 
 
These organizational types rest on contrasting rationales. Both EPFs and NEPFs protect the 
legacy of wealthy individuals or families and promote programmes or reforms that are 
congruent with their interests. EPFs are typically more associated with an individual or 
family than a NEPF and the board of governors is often dominated by family members or 
individuals closely identified with the family. NEPFs, in contrast, remain under the control of 
a prominent individual or family (or their representatives) but provide for independent 
representation at board level to enhance professional capacity and are named for an 
evident cause rather than an individual or family. CTs typically encompass broad skills-sets 
within their boards of directors, enhancing organizational governance, but can lack the 
charismatic leadership and elevated commercial acumen of EPFs and NEPFs dominated by 
elite philanthropists. EPFs, NEPFs and CTs typically have a common legal character, for 
instance, registration under Section 501(c)(3) of the 1988 US Internal Revenue Code,2 while 
LLCs and DAFs have a more hybrid legal character that dilutes their charitable character and 
minimises both taxation and regulation.3  
 In the context of international development, PPFs sit between bilateral aid agencies 
and development-focussed non-governmental organizations (NGOs), more specialised in 
their activities than the former, but less so than the latter (DAC-OECD 2003: 30). Due to 
inadequate reporting and accounting protocols, it’s unclear how much PPFs contribute to 
international development. A best estimate for 2008, for instance, puts it between $22 
billion and $53 billion (HOC-IDC 2012:5), equivalent to between 18% and 44% of the $119.8 
billion in official development assistance provided in 2008.4 An official estimate suggests 
that it is growing rapidly over time, doubling, for instance, between 2000 and 2009.5 
                                                          
2 Section 501(c)(3) covers a range of organizations with a charitable focus: ‘Religious, 
Education, Charitable, Scientific, Literary, Testing for Public Safety, to Foster National or 
International Amateur Sports Competition, or Prevention of Cruelty to Children or Animals 
Organizations’ 
3 See analysis of LLCs, for instance, in Callahan 2018:3-6. 
4 ‘Development aid at its highest level ever in 2008’, OECD statement, undated [2008], 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/developmentaidatitshighestleveleverin2008.htm, accessed 
September 2018.    
5 OECD figures, cited in HOC-IDC 2005: 5.  
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 BMGF and OSF represent examples of two organizational types here. As an EPF, 
BMGF is notable for both its immense wealth and its remarkably small board of directors 
(consisting of Bill Gates, his wife Melinda, and close friend Warren Buffett),6 ensuring that 
the foundation remains under tight, personalist, control. As a NEPF, in contrast, OSF is 
committed to a clear policy objective (the open societies characteristic of liberal 
democracies), diluting its association with a wealthy individual or family but nevertheless 
remains under the control of a single plutocrat. BMGF and OSF count among the wealthiest 
and most powerful CSOs in the world today. As captured in Table 1, below, BMGF was the 
wealthiest PPF in the world in 2017 measured by assets, with OSF in fourth place. OSF rises 
to third, and possibly second, when measured by annual expenditure. 
Secondly, I draw on the concept of polycentric governance to capture the link 
between PPFs and global governance. ‘Polycentric governance’ refers to plural and hybrid 
governance arrangements based on horizontal and vertical relationships among institutions 
of the state, market and/or civil society. Here, the term ‘polycentric’ 
connotes many centers of decision making that are formally independent of each 
other… To the extent that they take each other into account in competitive 
relationships, enter into various contractual and cooperative undertakings…the 
various political jurisdictions…may function in a coherent manner with consistent 
and predictable patterns of interacting behaviour. To the extent that this is so, they 
may be said to function as a ‘system’ (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren 1961: 831-32). 
 
In the work of Elinor Ostom, the concept of ‘polycentric governance’ is typically applied to 
the management of common property resources (cf. Ostrom 2010) but it also lends itself to 
analysis of both the global commons (e.g. climate change or global public health) and to 
mechanisms of global governance, for instance, and as here, relations between IGOs and 
transnational CSOs (in the form of PPFs). In the absence of a coherent global political 
authority and agreement among states as to the primacy of inter-governmental 
cooperation, market and civil society organizations become more salient to the conduct of 
public policy. No organization symbolises the reality of polycentric governance, in global 
terms, more than the World Economic Forum, the most powerful CSO in the world today 
precisely because of its role in linking governmental, business and civil society elites, with 
both Gates and Soros habitués of its annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland each January, an 
                                                          
6 ‘Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation: Consolidated Financial Statements 31 December 2017 
and 2016’, pg 5. [hereafter, ‘Financial Statements 2017’]; 
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event which rivals the UN General Assembly gatherings in September each year as a forum 
for elite diplomacy and networking.7 
 











Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (1) EPF USA 51,852 6,057 
Wellcome Trust (2) CT UK 27,840 n/a 
Howard Hughes Medical Institute(3) CT USA 22,588 936 
Open Society Foundations (4) NEPF USA 18,000 940 
Garfield Weston Foundation (5) EPF UK 12,787 57 
Ford Foundation (6) EPF USA 12,364 662 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (7) EPF USA 11,399 481 
Lilly Endowment (8) CT USA 10,293 348 
MBR Al Maktoum Foundation(9) EPF UAE 10,000 n/a 
William & Flora Hewlett Foundation (10) EPF USA 9,888 481 
* Unless otherwise stated in sources/notes below. 
 
Sources/Notes:  
(1)‘Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation: Consolidated Financial Statements 31 December 2017 and 2016’,; (2) 
Wellcome Trust, Investment portfolio balance as at 30 September 2017, listed in £UK and converted to US 
dollars at exchange rate of 1:1.2 as at 30 September 2017; (3) ‘Howard Hughes Medical Institute Consolidate 
Financial Statements for the years ended August 31, 2017 and 2016’; (4) Open Society Foundations, 2017 data, 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/history; (5) ‘Garfield Weston Foundation: Report and 
Accounts of the Trustees, 2017’, Assets as of 5 April 2017, in UK£ (converted to US$ at rate of 1:1.29 as at 5 
April 2017; (6) Data for 2016. ‘The Ford Foundation, Financial Statements as of December 31, 2016 and 2015’; 
(7) ‘Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Financial Statements December 31, 2017 and 2016’; (8) Data for 2016. 
‘Lilly Endowment Annual Report 2016’; (9) Data for 2007. The Foundation does not publish its accounts. 
Estimate for 2007 based on news reports, including Jon Leyne, ‘Dubai ruler in vast charity gift’, BBC News, 19 
May 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ world/middle_east/6672923.stm, and ‘Dubai sets up $10bn. education 
fund’, Al Jazeera News, undated (May 2007), https://www.aljazeera.com/business/2007/05/ 
2008525121912458294.html; (10) ‘The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation Financial Statements as of, and 
for, the Years ended December 31, 2017 and 2016’,  
 
The third and final element of the conceptual framework is the concept of the 
‘gilded age’, an age of heightened economic opportunity and prosperity, characterised by 
rising economic inequality and plutocratic excess.8 The first, US-centric, ‘gilded age’ began in 
the early 1870s, and lasted almost 60 years,9 ending with the 1929 economic crash and 
                                                          
7 For a balanced, book-length analysis of the WEF, see Pigman (2007).  
8 From the 1873 novel, The Gilded Age, by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner, satirising 
plutocratic greed and corruption in post-civil war America. 
9 In the US, the long depression of 1873-1897, associated with the rise of ‘robber barons’ 
and some of America’s great industrialists, gave way to a progressive era of reforms (1897-
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subsequent political reforms.10 It was fuelled by enhanced manufacturing techniques, new 
transport and communication technologies (e.g. rail networks, telephones and 
automobiles), and by rising income equality, partly stemming from low rates of income or 
wealth-based taxes.11  
One significant feature of the age, linking it to the first key concept here, was the rise 
of PPFs founded by its corporate titans, for instance, the Carnegie Corporation of New York 
established by steel magnate Andrew Carnegie in 1911, the Rockefeller Foundation by oil 
magnate John D. Rockefeller in 1913 and the Ford Foundation by the automobile 
entrepreneurs Edsel and Henry Ford in 1936.12 Foundation activities, however, proved 
deeply controversial. The Rockefeller Foundation, for instance, was denounced by the US 
Attorney General, as ‘an indefinite scheme for perpetuating vast wealth’ that was ‘entirely 
inconsistent with the public interest’.13 Invariably, these foundations defended corporate 
interests while supporting charitable causes. The Rockefeller Foundation’s work in its early 
years, for instance, was dominated by controversy surrounding the Ludlow Massacre of 
1914, when 24 people were killed at a Rockefeller mine in Colorado amid a bitter labour 
dispute (Roelofs 2003: 8-9). 
 The rise of the welfare state did much to redress the balance between the rich and 
the rest, partially constraining the growth and activities of PPFs after World War II. 
According to Freeland, for instance:  
Between the 1940s and the 1970s in the United States, the gap between the 
[richest] 1% and everyone else shrank; the income share of the top 1% fell from 
nearly 16% in 1940 to under 7% in 1970. Taxes were high- the top marginal rate was 
70 percent- but robust economic growth of an average of 3.7% percent a year 
between 1947 and 1977 created a broadly shared sense of optimism and prosperity 
(Freeland 2012: 14). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1920), followed by the ‘roaring twenties’ and the rise of mass consumerism (See, for 
instance, Freeland 2012: 6-24). 
10 Through the US ‘New Deal’ from 1933, and, largely, through post-World War II reforms in 
the case of the United Kingdom.  
11 Except briefly during the civil war, for instance, there was no federal income tax in the US 
until 1894. By 1913, federal income tax ranged from 1% to 6% for those on incomes of 
$500,000 or above. Dividends remained untaxed (Smith 2007: 40 & 110-111)). 
12 The latter, somewhat of an outlier, was established after the end of the first ‘gilded age’. 
13 Quoted in Callahan 2018:4.  
8 
 
From the early 1980s, however, a second ‘gilded age’ emerged, fuelled by neoliberal policies 
designed to tackle economic sclerosis and roll back the interventionist welfare state, aided 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union and allied regimes. Forty years later, its status remains 
unclear. In some respects, it remains in rude health, sustaining high levels of income 
inequality typical of a ‘gilded age’.14 According to Freeland, for instance, ‘In 1980, the 
average US CEO made forty-two times as much as the average worker. By 2012, that ratio 
had rocketed to 380’ (Freeland 2012: 14. In other respects, however, the second gilded age 
may have ended in the 2010s, due to transnational austerity and insecurity following the 
economic and financial crash of 2008-09 and amid a subsequent conservative, atavistic and 
nationalist back-lash against globalization. 
 The second gilded age includes some of the attributes of the first: an expansion of 
markets fuelled by free trade and technological innovation, especially in transport and 
communications (e.g. more efficient aircraft, ever smaller & more powerful computers, the 
internet), and a new generation of PPFs fuelled by new wealth, low taxation and light 
regulation. PFFs have been significant beneficiaries of this second gilded age. Comparing 
data in Table 1, above, with that in Table 2, below, reveals that the global top ten PPFs had 
cumulative assets of $187 billion (or $187,011m) in 2017, compared to $8 billion ($7,989m) 
in 1969-70, an almost 24-fold increase in 48 years, or a compounded seven per cent 
increase each year, a remarkable rate of growth, reflecting the great fortunes which elite 
philanthropists have extracted from economic and social globalization.  
Secondly, and conditionally, if the second gilded age ended in the mid-2010s, then it 
lasted roughly 35 years, a shorter version of its predecessor but one more extensive (global) 
in reach. The second gilded age changed the nature of the top PPFs but in other respects 
they remain constant. Only two of the PPFs in the global top ten in 1969, for instance, 
remained there in 2017, indicating the rise of a distinct new generation, although seven 
were US-based in 2017, compared to nine in 1969, suggesting that the top PPFs globally 
remain predominantly American in origin, if a little less so.  
 
                                                          
14 Income inequality increased substantially in most countries between 1980 and 2010, 
restoring it to levels unseen in Western economies since the first ‘gilded age’. In the US, for 
instance, the share of income controlled by the richest 1% fell from 15% in 1920 to 7% in 
1975 before rising to 18% in 2010 (See Alvaredo 2011: 28-29). 
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Table 2: Philanthropic Foundations: The Global Top Ten (by assets)(1969/70) 




1. Ford Foundation USA 2,902 
2. Robert Wood Johnson Foundation USA 1,102 
3. Lilly Endowment USA 778 
4. Rockefeller Foundation USA 757 
5. Duke Endowment USA 510 
6. Kresge Foundation USA 433 
7. W.K. Kellogg Foundation USA 393 
8. Volkswagenwerk Stiftung West Germany 376 
9. Charles Stewart Mott Foundation USA 371 
10. Pew Memorial Trust USA 367 
 
Source: Whitaker 1974: 15. 
 
Uniting these concepts and drawing on the analysis above, I seek answers below to 
the following research questions: 1. To what extent has the second ‘gilded age’ enabled 
private philanthropic foundations to play an enhanced role within an emerging global 
system of polycentric governance? and 2. To what extent does the history of the first gilded 
age suggest regulatory or other responses to any evidently enhanced role? To answer these 
questions, I draw on a hybrid methodology. I draw on multi-year financial statements and 
audited accounts to establish the financial resources of PPFs and other actors in the 
international system. For qualitative data, I draw on primary sources, including reports 
produced by PPFs, IGOs, CSOs, legislative bodies and think tanks, supplemented by media 
reportage and secondary literature. In section 3, I explore the work of Bill Gates and the 
BMGF, turning in section 4 to George Soros and OSF. In section 5, I present my conclusion, 
proposing measures for more effective regulation of their activities.   
 
3. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
The first case-study here, BMGF, was established in 2000, merging the William H. 
Gates Foundation and the Gates Library Foundation (both established in 1997), and is based 
in Seattle (Washington state), home of Microsoft, the computer software behemoth 
founded by Bill Gates and Paul Allen in 1975.15 Of the two founders, Gates was the more 
entrepreneurial, the hard-charging and ruthless negotiator to Allen’s technical ideas-man. 
                                                          
15 For the story of Gates and Microsoft, see Wallace & Erickson (1993). For Gates’ analysis of 
the digital revolution, see Gates (1995).  
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Gates pushed Allen out of Microsoft in 1983, before Microsoft’s sustained rapid growth, his 
name henceforth synonymous with the company he established. Gates’s hard-charging 
character is evident in the origins of BMGF. Echoing the Rockefeller Foundation’s response 
to the 1914 Ludlow massacre, BMGF was founded a year after the launch of a (successful) 
law-suit against Microsoft by the US government, and the revelation that his wealth had 
reached $100 billion, making him the richest man in the world (Gibbs 2005b:83). Prior to 
BMGF’s launch, Gates had been chided by others, including fellow billionaire Ted Turner, for 
his lack of generosity (McGoey 2015: 117). 
  Today, BMGF is funded by the extraordinary wealth of Gates, and his close friend 
and investor-extraordinaire, Warren Buffett, founder of, and main shareholder in, the 
Berkshire Hathaway holding company. In 2018, Gates and Buffett ranked as the second and 
third richest individuals in the world (behind, for the first time, Amazon founder Jeff Bezos) 
with wealth of $90 billion and $84 billion respectively.16 Together, Bezos, Gates and Buffett 
controlled more wealth in 2017 than the bottom half of the American population, 160 
million people (Collins & Hoxie 2017: 2). This marks out Gates and Buffett as significant 
luminaries of the second gilded age and hence BMGF as an effort by both to legitimate their 
wealth both socially and politically and to cement their place in history, both as corporate 
titans and notable public figures.  
In practice, BMGF is a complex entity, consisting of BMGF itself, the separately-
registered Gates Philanthropy Partners (GPP)(a vehicle to facilitate co-funding by large 
donors17) and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Trust (BMGFT), which manages 
BMGF’s assets and investments. Together, they employed 1,541 people in 2018,18 most of 
them located in BMGF’s 12-acre $350m campus-headquarters.19 BMGF also maintains 
regional offices in Washington DC, London, New Delhi, Beijing, Johannesburg, Addis Ababa 
and Abuja, providing it with significant global reach.20 
                                                          
16 The Sunday Times Rich List, The Sunday Times, 13 May 2018.  
17 Although the finances of both are captured by unified annual accounts (Financial 
Statements 2017, op cit, pg 5). 
18 BMGF Factsheet, https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-
Information/Foundation-Factsheet, accessed September 2018.  
19 ‘Our Seattle Campus’, brochure, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, undated [2017]; 
‘A Statement Regarding Our New Headquarters’, press release, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, undated [2010].   
20 Financial Statements 2017, op cit, pg. 5. 
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BMGF works in the US, focusing on educational reforms and information technology 
for poor communities, and across the developing world, promoting public health and other 
measures to reduce extreme poverty. According to Bill Gates, its mission is simple: ‘to give 
every child an equal chance to live’, within a context where, he argues, BMGF is ‘a tiny 
player’, with governments the main actors.21 Both assertions are disingenuous. In reality, 
BMGF is a behemoth, its resources now greater than that of leading IGOs. According to 
Table 3, below, BMGF had a larger annual budget in 2016 than every United Nations 
specialised agency, except the World Food Programme,22 and, by some distance, the world’s 
largest operational NGO by expenditure, the International Committee of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent.23  
BMGF’s financial heft has direct consequences for UN agencies and other IGOs that 
remain underappreciated. A relatively lone voice, McGoey (2015:149) suggests that the 
scale of BMGF spending on global health is comparable to that of the World Health 
Organization (WHO), giving it catalytic influence on global health policy.24 BMGF, for 
instance, has co-founded three significant global health partnerships: the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunization (the GAVI Alliance), the Global Fund to Fights Aids, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria (the Global Fund) and Innovation to Impact (i2i). These partnerships can point 
to significant success; GAVI, for instance, to more than 640m children immunised between 
2000 and 2016 (GAVI 2016:5). But such success has been achieved by a partial privatization 
of global health care, and a transfer of resources from IGOs to new public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). The WHO, for instance, co-founded GAVI and hosts the GAVI secretariat 
in its Geneva headquarters, but has been undermined by both BMGF and GAVI, its resources 
cut as official donors, incentivised by matching funding from BMGF, switch funding to GAVI 
and to other health PPPs. From $3,164m in 2013, for instance, the WHO’s budget fell to 
                                                          
21 ‘My way to shed all those million’, Bill Gates interview with Danny Fortson, Business 
section, The Sunday Times, 15 April 2018.   
22 The DPKO is funded separately, outside the core UN budget, and is not an inter-
governmental organization (IGO) is its own right. 
23 Double check this fact and provide a supporting reference. 
24 In 2006, it devoted 60% of its resources to global health (Gibbs 2006b: 77), and by 2014, it 
had spent an estimated $15.3 billion on global health programmes (McGoey 2015:153). 
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$2,475m in 2015 and $2,364m in 2016.25. In contrast, GAVI’s expenditure rose from 
$1,614m in 2013 to $1,782m in 2015 and $1,819m in 2016.26  
 
Table 3: Resources of United Nations Agencies, Private Foundations and NGOs, 2016* 
 
Organization Type Expenditure/ 
Budget 2016 
(US$ million) 
World Food Program (WFP) UN Agency 5,908 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) Foundation  5,356 
UN System (secretariat)(UN) UN Agency 5,147 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) UN Agency 5,102 
United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) UN Agency 4,883 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) UN Agency 3,973 
World Health Organization (WHO) UN Agency 2,364 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) UN Agency 1,615 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) NGO 1,587 
Médecins Sans Frontières International (MSF) NGO 1,386 
 
Sources: UN Agencies: Total Revenue by Agency, FY 2016, https://www.unsystem.org/content/FS-A00-03; 
BMGF: BMGF audited accounts for FY2016, available at https://www.gatesfoundation.org/ Who-We-
Are/General-Information/Financials; ICRC: ICRC Annual Report 2016, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/annual-report-2016 (expenditure as at 31 December 2016 reported in 
Swiss Francs (CHF) and converted to US$ at exchange rate of US$1.00= CHF 1.0159 as at 31 December 2016. 
MSF: MSF International Finance Report 2016, available at https://www.msf.org/reports-and-finances. Annual 
expenditure €1,459m (2016), converted to US$ at exchange rate of $1 = €0.905 as at 31 December 2016.  
 
IGOs such as the WHO currently find themselves in a perilous financial predicament 
due to the rise of PPPs, a decline in contributions from member-states, and an 
unprecedented series of humanitarian crises around the world, especially in Syria and 
Yemen. In July 2018, for instance, UN Secretary General António Gutteres announced that 
the UN was more deeply in the red and much earlier in the financial year than ever before, 
necessitating unprecedented budgetary cuts (Beaumont 2018). As such, PPFs, such as 
BMGF, represent a distinct threat to democratically-accountable inter-governmental 
cooperation, exacerbating the effects of the contemporary backlash against neo-liberal 
globalization and the inter-governmental cooperation often blamed, in part, for its rise.  
As the GAVI example reveals, BMGFs financial resources are effectively deployed by 
Bill Gates to create partnerships and networks which catalyse globally-significant systemic 
                                                          
25 Based on data for ‘Total Revenue by Agency’, extracted from https://www.unsystem.org/ 
content/FS-A00-03, accessed September 2018.   
26 Based on figures from GAVI annual financial reports for 2013, ‘15 and ’16, 
https://www.gavi.org/funding/financial-reports/, accessed September 2018. 
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change. According to Time magazine, the work of Gates and BMGF is underpinned by a clear 
maxim: ‘Think globally. Act carefully. Prove what works. Then use whatever levers you have 
to get it done’ (Gibbs 2005a: 45). Bill Gates is a serial networker and coalition-builder. 
Through focus on discrete issues such as immunisation, disease control, and seed-based 
agricultural technologies, and through high-level networking, he has acted as the tipping-
point in a significant shift from inter-governmental cooperation to public-private 
partnerships of various hues. Figure 1, below, lists nine transnational organizations 
established mainly or partially by Bill Gates and BMGF. Collectively, they represent one of 
the most remarkable attempts by an individual or allied organization to influence the nature 
of global governance and the structure of international society. 
The mission statements of BMGF and related organizations in Figure 1, along with 
the views expressed by Gates in interviews, suggest they collectively promote interventions 
which are innovative, disruptive, evidence-based, value-for-money and, ultimately, 
transformative.27 But are they effective and do they really represent value for money? The 
question is important, because an estimated 40% of BMGF funding comes from public  
subsidies via taxation foregone (Thompson 2018: 56) and because Gates places so much 
emphasis on evidence-based policy.28 According to its enthusiastic champions, Bishop & 
Green (2008), however, philanthrocapitalism is potentially rather than evidently successful, 
and they offer little evidence of real impact or efficacy. Similarly, a UK parliamentary inquiry 
concludes that BMGF ‘has shown that risk-taking and innovation can produce outstanding 
results’ (HOC-IDC 2005: 11), but offers no concrete evidence. 
Studies suggest, however, that while the efficacy of PPF interventions is difficult to 
measure, much of the evidence that does exist brings it into question. In the case of global 
health, for instance, McCoy et al (2009) argue that financing is fragmented, complicated and 
inadequately monitored and tracked (McCoy et al 2009: 413). ‘Many transaction costs’, they 
argue, ‘come attached to the proliferation of global health actors and initiatives and to 
                                                          
27 In contrast, Bishop and Green suggest that modern philanthropy is ‘strategic’, ‘market-
conscious’, ‘impact-oriented’, ‘knowledge-based’, often ‘high engagement’ and always 
driven by the goal of maximising ‘leverage’ (Bishop & Green 2008: 6).   
28 According to BMGF’s website, ‘To bring about the kinds of changes that will help people 
live healthier and more productive lives, we seek to understand the world’s inequities. 
Whether the challenge is low-yield crops in Africa or low graduation rates in Los Angeles, we 
listen and learn so we can identify pressing problems that get too little attention’. See 
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work, accessed September 2018.    
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convoluted channels of financing’ (Ibid).  Similarly, a UK parliamentary enquiry notes that 
developing country governments are subject to a new layer of aid conditionality and 
additional demands for engagement/consultation and that PPFs such as BMGF are covered 
by neither the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness nor the International Aid Transparency 
Initiative, hindering transparency and accountability (HOC-IDC 2005: 12-13 & 23).  
 
Figure 1: International Partnerships and Networks co-founded by Bill Gates and/or BMGF 
Partnership or Network 
 
Purpose Other partners 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization (GAVI or the GAVI 
Alliance)(est. 2000) 
https://www.gavi.org/ 
Vaccine development and 
immunisation in developing 
countries 
WHO, UNICEF, World Bank, 
leading pharmaceutical 
companies, 
The Global Fund to Fights Aids, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (the 
Global Fund)(est. 2002)  
https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/ 
International financing 
organization tackling epidemics 
through innovative technology 
and care programmes 
UN and bilateral aid agencies, host 
governments, NGOs, private 
sector companies 
Grand Challenges (est. 2003) 
https://grandchallenges.org 
A family of initiatives fostering 
innovations to solve key 
global problems 
USAID, Grand Challenges Canada, 
others 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa (AGRA)(est. 2006) 
https://agra.org/  
Seeds-based and other reforms to 
empower small and medium-scale 
African farmers 
Rockefeller Foundation, USAID, 
Monsanto, Cargill & others 
DATA (Debt, AIDS, Trade, 
Africa)(est. 2002)/ONE (est. 2007) 
https://www.one.org/africa/  
 
International advocacy and 
campaigning work to eliminate 
extreme poverty in Africa 
Bono, ONE Foundation 
The Think Tank Initiative (est. 2008) 
http://www.thinktankinitiative.org/  
Multi-donor initiative to 
strengthen 43 policy research 
institutions in 20 developing 
countries over 10 years  
William & Flora Hewlett 
Foundation, British, Dutch, 
Norwegian & Canadian aid 
ministries 
The Giving Pledge (est. 2010) 
https://givingpledge.org/  
Campaign to encourage wealthy 
people to donate most or all of 
their wealth to charitable causes 
Warren Buffett, David Rockefeller, 
Elon Musk and 180 other 
signatories (2018) 
 Innovation to Impact (i2i)(est. 
2013) 
https://innovationtoimpact.org/ 
Vector control tools to tackle 
increased insecticide resistance in 
vectors and gaps in transmission 
protection 
WHO, UNESCO, the Global Fund, 
private sector companies, national 
regulatory authorities 




Catalytic leadership and action in 
support of the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals 2015-2030 
Heads of State, business leaders, 
civil society activists, celebrities  
 
 
Furthermore, McGoey (2015), drawing on detailed cases from India, Ghana and the 
US, argues that BMGF expenditure is often wasted and inefficient and not assessed to the 
same standard as public agencies (McGoey 2015: 24-28). Of wider import, she argues, PPFs 
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such as BMGF may be exacerbating global inequality and poverty, because PPFs deprive 
treasuries of badly needed funds, because most PPF funding is not directed at low-income 
households and because philanthropy is effectively deployed to thwart demands for higher 
taxation, stricter regulation and redistributive public policy (Ibid: 18-19). Amid the backlash 
against neo-liberal globalization, and the links between PPFs and private companies, BMGF 
has been banned from certain activities in India amid a controversy over vaccine trials, and 
provoked controversy in Pakistan where Gates carelessly invoked polio vaccination as ‘God’s 
work’ (McGoey 2015: 161-170 & 156).   
BMGF spends barely 5% of its endowment each year, the minimum allowed under 
the US tax code (Gibbs 2006b: 88), suggesting a focus on institutional longevity rather than 
public welfare, while its investment vehicle, BMGFT, carefully minimises tax liabilities. US-
based PPFs pay federal excise tax of 2% on investment income, including interest, dividends 
and gains on the sale of investments, or 1% where certain conditions are met. Investment 
losses can be written off against tax and taxes payable can be deferred (see for instance, 
Thompson 2018:55). In the financial year 2017, BMGFT paid excise taxes of $58,477 and it 
deferred excise taxes of $61,808 on ‘investment income’ of $8.3 billion and ‘total revenue 
and other net gains’ of $15.9 billion,29 suggesting sophisticated tax avoidance practices. Bill 
Gates has been a successful catalyst of globally-significant institutional change and BMGF 
has transformed key institutional arrangements in international development, especially in 
health care, with tangible consequences for millions of people in the developing world. 
Beyond narrow, results-based reporting or ‘value for money’ tests, however, an assessment 
of BMGF and its founder requires a wider analytical lens.  
 
4. George Soros and the Open Society Foundations 
The second case-study PPF here, the Open Society Foundations (OSF), was founded 
in 1993 by George Soros, the Hungarian-American hedge-fund entrepreneur. It dates to the 
Open Society Fund established in 1979 to enable black students to attend the University of 
Cape Town, merging foundations established since then, including the Open Society 
Foundation in Hungary, founded in 1984 (Tamkin 2017). Like Bill Gates, Soros is an elite 
‘philanthrocapitalist’, combining interests as a financier and public intellectual to promote a 
                                                          
29 ‘Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Trust, Financial Statements, December 31, 2017 and 
2016’, pp. 3 & 11.  
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distinct vision of international society.30 His combination of wealth and networking skills and 
his commitment to globally-significant systemic change makes him a ‘global governor’ who 
commands the attention of markets and governments alike.31   
Eighty-seven years old in 2018, Soros is best known for short-selling the British 
pound in 1992, precipitating a currency crisis and forcing the government out of the-then 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism.32 This made him an instant, and controversial, global 
figure.33 But while OSF’s launch a year after the currency crisis suggested a deliberate 
attempt at reputational redemption, the speculation continued. In 1997, an attack on the 
Thai Baht helped trigger the East Asian economic crisis, with devastating consequences, 
prompting the-then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to condemn Soros and 
others of making fortunes that were ‘quite literally financial killings’ (Mahathir 2011: 667 & 
670).  
Soros’s foundation, OSF, takes its name from Karl Popper’s The Open Society and its 
Enemies (1945), a passionate defence of liberal democracy and a trenchant critique of both 
fascism and communism. OSF promotes liberal democracy and associated causes around 
the world, especially in formerly communist states, and a consciously polycentric ‘global 
open society’ (Soros 2002: xi). It is best known for its work in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when Soros poured hundreds of 
millions of dollars into democratic reform programmes, ‘a one-man Marshall Plan for 
Eastern Europe, [and] a private initiative without historical precedent’, according to one 
commentator (Steinberger 2018).  
Under Soros, OSF is sometimes regarded as a left-leaning organization (in relative 
terms), critical, for instance, of certain features of global capitalism and globalization (see, 
for instance, Soros 2000 & 2002). Soros locates himself in a battle between ‘market 
fundamentalists’ and ‘antiglobalization activists’ (Soros 2002: 10)34, but OSF’s liberalism, 
with some exceptions, bears closer comparison to neoliberalism than to the classical 
                                                          
30 For biographical and auto-biographical accounts of his life, see Kaufman (2002) and Soros 
(1995) 
31 According to The New York Times, Soros is a ‘philanthropist, political activist and freelance 
statesman’, as well as ‘an agent of history’ (Steinberger 2018). 
32 In 1992, the Quantum Fund also bet against the Italian lira, again forcing a significant 
devaluation.  
33 As the man ‘who broke the Bank of England’, as the newspaper headlines proclaimed. 
34 Vague terms, which he does not define. 
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liberalism in which democracy is traditionally rooted, especially in its advocacy of reforms to 
transnational political arrangements which mirror those of the transnational market-
economy.35  
In contrast to Gates, the quintessential insider, Soros is an outsider, a disreputable 
arbitragist or speculator,36 and a Jewish émigré who survived Nazi fascism before fleeing 
communist Hungary in 1947 for the UK and then the US (Guilhot 2007: 463 & 456). As a 
result, perhaps, OSF is less widely known than BMGF and is sometimes omitted from 
analyses of PPFs and international development (see, for instance, Pratt et al (2012))37. Yet, 
with headquarters in New York, OSF is a genuinely global CSO, with offices in 37, and 
grantees in over 100, countries, linking national foundations and network-wide 
programmes. Like Gates, Soros is a serial networker and a serial starter of new 
organizational initiatives. Figures 2, below, lists nine networks established by Soros or OSF. 
These initiatives are less well-resourced than those established by Gates and BMGF, and less 
connected to key multilateral organizations but, collectively, they nevertheless reveal 
another remarkable commitment to globally-significant systemic change.  
Soros and OSF currently sit at the heart of contemporary global disputes between 
advocates of liberal cosmopolitanism and conservative nationalism. OSF is banned in China 
(Yu 2016)(unlike BMGF), in Russia (Walker 2015) and in Singapore (Jaipragas 2018), and is 
on a government ‘watch list’ in India (Basu 2016). It has been criticised in the US for 
supporting liberal candidates in elections,38 and in the UK for supporting calls for a second 
referendum on Britain’s departure from the European Union.39 The antipathy is greatest, 
however, in the former communist regimes of Central Europe, especially in his birth place, 
                                                          
35 ‘The development of our international institutions’, he argues, ‘has not kept pace with the 
development of international financial markets and our political arrangements have lagged 
behind the globalization of the economy’ (Soros 2002: vii). 
36 Arbitrage is the simultaneous buying and selling of securities, currency, or commodities in 
different markets or in derivative forms in order to take advantage of differing prices for the 
same asset. For Soros’ account of it, see Soros (1987). 
37 There is, for instance, no study of OSF, equivalent to McGoey (2015), examining BMGF. 
38 See, for instance, St John & Vansickle (2018), according to which Soros has contributed 
$1.5m to a Political Action Committee targeting four of the 56 District Attorney positions in 
California elected on 5 June. Soros has also supported liberal candidates in other US states. 
39 Soros reportedly contributed £800,000 to Best for Britain, a campaign group opposed to 
Brexit. According to Conservative MP Owen Patterson, quoted in the Daily Mail of 24 May 
2018, this was ‘a brazen attempt to undermine our democracy’, antipathy echoed by other 
politicians and newspapers.   
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Hungary. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the Fedesz party have waged a relentless 
campaign against Soros and OSF since 2010, peaking in the 2018 election campaign, where 
Fedesz promoted a ‘Stop Soros’ legislative package, amid allegations that a ‘Soros 
mercenary army’ was working ‘to bring down the government’ (Walker 2018a). In May 
2018, in response, OSF announced the closure of its Budapest office and its relocation to 
Berlin (Buckley 2018), while in October the Soros-funded Central European University 
announced the planned transfer of most of its activities from Budapest to Vienna (Walker 
2018b). 
Figure 2: International Networks and Partnerships co-founded by George Soros and/or 
OSF 
Networks or Partnership Activities Partners 
Central European University, 
Budapest (est. 1991) 
https://www.ceu.edu/  
Independent university committed 
to liberal and cosmopolitan values 
World Bank, New York State 
University 
Open Society Institute Assistance 
Foundation (est. 1993) 
https://www.globalhand.org/en/or
ganisations/22268  
Private operating and grant-making 
foundation active in Russia and  
former communist states in Central 
Asia 
OSF and other autonomous Soros-
linked foundations 
Open Society Initiative for West 
Africa (est. 2000) 
http://www.osiwa.org/ 
Coalition of autonomous West 
African Soros foundations active in 
18 countries 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Abdul Tejan-
Cole, El Hadj Sy, autonomous 
West African Soros foundations 




Organization committed to public 
statement of principles relating 
to open access to academic 
research-based literature 
Bioline International, Next Page 
Foundation, Electronic Society for 
Social Scientists, Public Library of 
Science, BioMed Central. 
Alliance for Open Society 
International (est. 2003) 
https://www.guidestar.org/profile
/81-0623035 
US public charity which promotes 
the values of open, democratic 
societies globally. Administers 
national and regional programmes, 
mostly in Central Asia 
US. Federal government and 
associated federal agencies 
Open Society Initiative for East 
Africa (est. 2005) 
https://www.osiea.org/  
Coalition of autonomous East 
African Soros foundations active in 
4 countries 
Autonomous East African Soros 
foundations in partnership with 
local NGOs and think tanks 
European Council on Foreign 
Relations  (est. 2008) 
https://www.ecfr.eu/ 
Pan-European think tank which 
promotes a coherent European 
values-based foreign policy 
Communitas Foundation, Siegfried 
Rausing, Unicredit, 
Institute for New Economic 
Thinking (est. 2009) 
https://www.ineteconomics.org/  
Independent think tank which 
promotes ‘sound economic ideas 
to serve humanity’ in the wake of 
2009-2012 global financial crisis 
University of Cambridge, Paul 
Volcker, David Rockefeller, 
Malcolm Hewitt Foundation, 
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation 





OSF initiative which endeavours to 
strengthen the rights, voices, and 
democratic power of society’s least 
privileged groups, and thus make 
democracy work better for all in 
Europe 





Antipathy to Soros and OSF across the world is symptomatic of wider antipathy to the post-
war liberal international order, or more accurately, to accelerated socio-economic processes 
of globalization in recent decades which have stretched government capacity intolerably 
and fractured the political consensus on which liberal democracy is based. Yet the rise of 
OSF and other PPFs is closely linked to these very same processes of change.  
 
5. Conclusion. 
In an important text, Callahan (2018) points to the growing influence of PPFs and 
their founders within the United States. Extending this argument to the global stage, I argue 
that rich philanthropists such as Bill Gates and George Soros effectively function as ‘global 
governors’, using their significant wealth and organizational acumen to generate disruptive 
transnational socio-political power through the activities of philanthropic foundations and 
associated networks. In doing so, they both benefit from, and accelerate, growing 
movement towards a distinct polycentric ‘system’ for the coordination of international 
society, diluting traditional inter-governmental cooperation, and the role of politicians, 
diplomats and international civil servants and at the expense of multilateral organizations 
and states in the developing world. They also transform the nature of global civil society, 
making it a more elite and centralised political space, weakening its democratic and 
emancipatory potential, and making it easier for powerful special interests to exploit 
weakened inter-governmental cooperation. Effectively, they are rule-makers rather than 
rule-takers, in part because of inadequate transnational regulation of their activities, a 
problem partly explained, in turn, by the declining resources available to key inter-
governmental organizations. The men differ. Gates, through his commitment to techno-fixes 
or technological change, primarily seeks change in institutional arrangements, whereas 
Soros, the more cerebral, is primarily interested in normative change through the spread of 
ostensibly liberal democratic values. But ultimately, and collectively, they are significant 
primarily as harbingers of a turbo-charged, disruptive neoliberalism, their ostensible success 
partly evidenced by the current conservative nationalist backlash against them. 
In contrast to Bishop & Green (2008) who view these them in positive and uncritical 
terms, the argument here suggests that PPFs and their founders engage in complex 
processes of ‘othering’, of identifying and addressing social problems at some remove from 
themselves and their wealth-generating activities, white-washing their commercial 
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misdeeds (actual or perceived). They also target niche public policy areas where they can be 
effective market leaders. Bill Gates and BMGF, for instance, target global diseases rather 
than the monopolistic and anti-democratic turns of the internet age while George Soros and 
OSF primarily promote open societies rather than the regulation of transnational financial 
markets or the taxation of transnational capital movements. Compared to other citizens, 
they enjoy disproportionate benefits: the right to forego tax on their wealth and to choose 
the causes on which they spend money. They symbolise important elements of the second 
gilded age, including its technological character (in the case of Gates, the tech lord) and its 
financial character (in the case of Soros, the hedge fund lord).  
The history of the first ‘gilded age’ suggests that the power of rich philanthropists, 
and the foundations which they manage, can be tamed by a combination of regulatory or 
anti-trust measures;40 progressive taxation and an interventionist state;41 and the 
displacement of charitable activity through the protection and promotion of the rights of 
citizens.42 The wealth of contemporary ‘philanthrocapitalists’ must therefore be taxed more 
effectively, to shift funding from discretionary philanthropic spending to entitlements-based 
or rights-based governmental spending, while PPF assets must be taxed more effectively to 
ensure a focus on public welfare rather than institutional longevity.  
The analysis here suggests that national legislation must be accompanied by greater 
international oversight. A body such as the Development Assistance Committee of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC-OECD) should require PPFs 
to register transnational grants & programmes and to abide by international standards for 
aid provision such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative. PPFs must also be 
constrained from developing parallel processes for aid delivery and duplicating inter-
governmental arrangements which impose distinct costs on governments and CSOs in 
beneficiary countries, and which provide opportunities for powerful special interest groups.  
Other provisions might include foundations publishing an annual report and 
accounts and having independent members on their board of trustees (reflecting the public 
                                                          
40 For instance, reforms initiated by the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt 
(1901-1909) (See Smith 2007). 
41 For instance, the administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933-1945) and 
the American ‘New Deal’ (Ibid). 




money invested in them through tax concessions and government grants). They could also 
be required to spend at least 5% of assets each year or to liquidate all assets within less than 
40 years, with new measures to avoid the loopholes in current, for instance, US, national 
legislation. To receive public funding, PPFs should also be required to be members of 
relevant trade or professional associations which promote self-regulation and common 
standards. With these reforms, the positive work of PPFs can be enhanced and the negative 
consequences reduced, strengthening global civil society and other authoritative global 
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